・In the Battle off the Mariana coast to be carried out from Showa 19/6/19, 3 aircraft carriers out of 9 aircraft carrier task forces sank, and the 6 remaining ships were also severely damaged by enemy submarines and enemy aircraft, and most of the carrier-based aircraft were lost and destroyed, but the US military only lost 100 carrier-based aircraft, and the Allied Fleet's Outrange tactics were completely blocked in front of enemy anti-aircraft radars · VT fuzes · F6F Hellcat fighter jets As a result, they were driven into a catastrophic state and lost control of the South Pacific Ocean, and as a result, it became clear that the US military was absolutely unable to compete not only in terms of material volume but also in terms of weapon performance and tactics (p5)
・Opinions searching for tactics that go beyond the common sense of the Japanese military until now have already been fueled since they were struggling in the Solomon region, but since the Japanese Navy leadership did not accept the “desperate must” special attack tactic, no concrete progress was seen, but conventional “traditional tactics = 99% decisive attacks involving death always do this, but the law with no path to survival attack has definitely rejected this” to “desperate desperate” It must be understood that such special circumstances were in the background that turned into (p5)
・After the war, US Navy Lieutenant Wermeister achieved the same results as the Kurita Fleet (dozens of battleships Yamato and below) where only a dozen kamikaze aircraft attacked the escort aircraft carrier group on the same day, as stated that kamikaze did not succeed in destroying the US fleet and caused a great deal of damage, and that such results would not have been achieved with conventional tactics (p6)
・As the English historian Wells described the world-historic medical treatment of the Great East Asia War, saying “this system put an end to colonialism, brought equality between white people and people of color, and laid the foundation for a world federation,” it seems that the Great East Asia War was a war that gave an opportunity to create many independent nations in Asia and Africa after the war (p13)
・Despite the fact that the majority of Army and Navy Special Attack Force members are composed of volunteers, the reason they dare to collect only manuscripts from members of the Special Attack Force who are students is probably because there are more materials convenient for criticizing special attacks than volunteers (p29)
・Similar to crew members, the Army and Navy also had units that refused special attacks (343 Naval Air Force, 203 Naval Air Force 303 Squadron, 131 Naval Air Force, 762 Naval Air Force Attack 501 Squadron, 931 Naval Air Force, Army 65 Squadron, Army 100 Fighter Squadron), and if a special attack is an order, there is no way that such refusal can be made in the military where they must absolutely obey orders; those who refused were able to refuse This is because they respected the crew's reasonable reasons (p51)
・The total number of Army and Navy special attack aircraft that sortied for about 10 months from Showa 19/10/20 to Showa 20/8/15 is 3461 (army aircraft 1094, navy aircraft 2367), and the total number of special attack deaths is 4379 people (army 1844, navy 2535) (p213)
・ In just 10 months of the 44-month war, 48.1% of the total number of damaged American warships were fought, 21.3% of the total number of sunken ships were fought by special attack aircraft, and the effective rate of hitting 474 aircraft at the cost of 2550 aircraft was 18.6% (p216)
・Confidential US Navy documents that have been declassified are records for 5 months from 1944/10 to March of the following year, and they record that the hit rate of 356 hit attacks, 140 special attack hits, 39% hit rate, 59 damage due to self-destruct close to special attack aircraft, 17% damage rate of close suicide bombers, 56% total special attack effectiveness rate, 130 ships hit, and 20 sunken ships (P218) The hit rate of lightning and artillery at the time was 2% The results of the Special Attack Force are amazing even when viewed from the fact that it is said that it was before and after (p235)
・It was only at the beginning that the special attack aircraft failed to reach the target, and the truth is that they carried out a concentrated attack on the picket ship (radar patrol ship) from the second half, and another group cut into the enemy's headquarters through that gap; during the 1991 Gulf War, the US military first destroyed the Iraqi military's radar site and then attacked Baghdad, but destroyed the radar network and then cut into the enemy's headquarters was first invented by the Japanese military There is (p231)
・The number of airplanes produced by the Japanese Naval Air Force in 25 years was 43,399, but in Battle Zero, 1410 aircraft, which is 1/4 of that, were produced from prototype to the end of the war, and 1188 zero battles, which is 11.4% of the total, were dispatched as special attack aircraft, which is 50.2% of the total number of special attack aircraft in the entire Navy (p238)
・The US military prohibited publication of battle results for half a year until 4/12 for fear that the morale of allies would be affected by enormous damage caused by special attacks since Operation Leyte (p251)
